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1. Introduction  
The introduction of competition and markets into public service has b een a recurrent 
theme in recent reforms initiated by governments across the OECD. However, whilst the 
rhetoric has been strong, the evidence of the effectiveness of such reforms is somewhat 
weaker. The UK government has been a world leader in such reforms, introducing 
markets into publicly funded healthcare, education, and housing amongst other services  
(Le Grand and Bartlett 1993).  In this paper we examine the impact of the introduction of 
competition into a large and complex public sector organisation: the UK National Health 
Service. Competition between suppliers of health care in the UK was introduced in 1991, 
actively promoted and then later downplayed. Using panel data on English hospitals and 
exploiting variation in competition across time and space for identification, we study the 
impact of competition on the quality of healthcare. 
Prior to 1991, publicly funded hospital based health care in the UK
1 was supplied by 
hospitals that received funding, based on their local populations, directly from central 
government.  In 1991 the Conservation administration introduced competition on the 
supply side of the health care market by breaking the link between provision and funding. 
It created a set of buyers, funded by central government, who were free to purchase 
health care for their populations from both public and private sector suppliers. Public 
sector suppliers were therefore not given direct funding, but were set to compete with 
each other, alongside a small private sector, for contracts from these public buyers. 
Competition was thus created by policy. Competition was actively promoted upto the 
mid-1990s, then somewhat downplayed. In 1997 the incoming Labour administration 
formally introduced policy change, stressing the role of co-operation over competition, 
though the separation between buyer and seller of health care remained (and remains 
currently). 
Competition in health care markets is geographically-based, as the service provided 
requires the user to travel to a provider of health care to receive it.  By means of 
geography, some sellers of health care are therefore located in markets which are 
                                                  
1 Publicly funded care accounts for over 85 percent of UK health care expenditure (Propper 2002).   2 
inherently more competitive than others. Thus the identification of the impact of 
competition is difficult, as location is intertwined with competitiveness. In cross-sectional 
analyses competition is therefore not separable from geography and the correlates of this 
geography, which might, for example, include the health of local populations or a history 
of funding. Whilst attempts can be made to control for observables, unobservables that 
are correlated with geography, but are not due to competition, may still affect the health 
care outcome in each market and their impact be incorrectly attributed to competition. 
While panel data can be used to control for unobservables, the slow changing nature of 
health care markets means that competition is often essentially fixed over a number of 
years. Thus typically identifying the competitive effect is difficult. 
The strategy adopted here is to identify the impact of competition from the interplay of 
geography and policy change. We use the fact that competition is simply not possible in 
some areas to separate hospitals into two groups: one group for which competition was 
possible and one group for which it was not. We then exploit the fact that policy changed 
over the period 1990s. Competition was introduced in 1991 and was actively promoted 
upto 1995: it was then somewhat downplayed from 1996 and then, after the change in 
administration, actively discouraged post-1997. We identify the impact of competition 
from the difference in quality between those hospitals for which competition was possible 
and those for which it was not between years when competition was actively promoted 
and those when it was not.  
We construct a panel of all acute hospitals in England from 1991 to 1999. We measure 
quality in terms of death rates from emergency admissions for acute myocardial 
infarction (AMI). Mortality from AMI has been widely used to assess the quality of care 
of hospitals in the US health care market (see below) and was published as a measure of 
quality for UK hospitals for the first time in 1999
2. We find that competition reduced this 
measure of quality: death rates in areas subject to competition were higher than in areas 
not subject to competition during the first part of the 1990s but declined somewhat from 
1996 onwards. We estimate the cumulative impact of competition on death rates to have 
                                                  
2 As detailed below, we use administrative data to construct these quality measures back to 1991.   3 
more or less negated the fall in death rates that the whole sector experienced, probably as 
a result of technological innovation. 
The organisation of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
relationship between quality and competition.  Section 3 presents the key characteristics 
of the NHS reforms that introduced competition, discussed the nature of competition in 
this ‘internal market’ and describes our econometric strategy. Section 4 presents the data. 
The results are in Section 5. The final section presents our conclusions. 
 
2. Empirical evidence on the impact of competition on quality 
in health care 
A large empirical literature has examined the impact of competition in markets for health 
care services. While early work focused on the consequences for prices and costs (for 
example, Dranove and White, 1994)), there is now a growing body of evidence on the 
impact of competition on quality.  What appears to be emerging is rather a mixed picture. 
Shortell and Hughes (1988) examined the association between in-hospital mortality 
among Medicare patients and hospital concentration, and found a small and insignificant 
association between them. However, their methodology has since been criticised for their 
use of a fixed radius measure of geographic markets. Kessler and  McClellan (2000) 
analysed the impact of competition on both costs and patient health outcomes.  They use 
longitudinal Medicare claims data for the majority of elderly non-rural beneficiaries who 
were admitted to a hospital with Acute Myocardial Infraction from 1985-1994.  They 
combined that with data on hospital characteristics collected by the American Hospital 
Association.  They found that before 1991 competition led to higher costs and lower rates 
of adverse health outcomes but after 1990 competition led both to substantially lower 
costs and significantly lower rates of adverse outcomes.    As of 1991, patients in the least 
competitive fourth of hospital markets experienced approximately 1.5 percentage points 
higher mortality than those in competitive areas.    This might suggest that in the absence 
of competitive pressures between providers, hospitals take advantage of their market 
power by skimping on quality of care.  Kessler and McClellan conclude from their study   4 
that whilst the welfare effects of competition in the 1980s were ambiguous, post-1990 
competition was unambiguously welfare improving.     
Other studies have found more mixed results. Ho and Hamilton (2000) tested the 
hypothesis that hospital mergers and acquisitions decrease competition and therefore 
reduce quality of care in the local market.   They compared the quality of hospital care 
before and after mergers and acquisitions in California between 1992 and 1995.  They 
found that hospital mergers had no effect on either heart attack or stroke inpatient 
mortality.  Volpp and Waldfogel (2001) studied the impact of price competition in New 
Jersey on the quality of hospital care.   They found that mortality from heart attacks 
increased following hospital rate deregulation, suggesting that more active price 
competition was accompanied by a decrease in quality competition. Gowrisankararan and 
Town (2001) estimated the effect of competition for both HMO and Medicare patients on 
hospital-specific mortality rates of hospitals in Southern California.  They used data from 
the OSHPD patient discharge database to formulate risk-adjusted hospital mortality rates 
for AMI and pneumonia.  They found that increases in the degree of competition for 
HMO patients decrease risk-adjusted hospital mortality rates for both pneumonia and 
AMI but increases in competition for Medicare enrollees are associated with increases in 
risk-adjusted death rates for both diagnoses. From this they concluded that, in contrast 
with the rest of the market, the Medicare system does not generate incentives for 
hospitals to compete on quality. 
There is much less UK evidence on the impact of competition in health care, despite this 
being a central plank of the NHS reforms of the 1990s. Glennerster (1998) draws together 
the empirical literature in this area and concludes that little evidence exists. Exceptions 
include the work of Propper (1996), Propper et al. (1998), and Söderlund et al. (1997) 
who investigate the impact of the internal market on prices, costs and productivity. In the 
only large-scale study to date of the impact of competition on quality, Propper et al 
(2002) examined the relationship between competition and quality. As a measure of 
quality they use death rates after treatment following heart attacks.  For each hospital they 
calculated a number of measures of competition, based on the number of suppliers within 
each hospital’s catchment area.  The catchment area was based on travel times, so avoids 
the problem associated with fixed radius measures or those based on administrative   5 
boundaries. The measure also uses potential rather than a ctual patient flows, and so 
avoids problems of endogeneity that may be associated with measures based on actual 
patient flows. An average death rate was calculated for the years 1995-7 for each 
hospital. Using a cross-sectional analysis they found that competition appears to be 
associated with lower quality (higher death rates), after controlling for patient mix and 
other observed characteristics of the hospital and its catchment area. The present paper 
builds on this work through the use of a panel, rather than a cross-section, data set of 
hospitals. 
 
3. The UK health care market  
(a) Health care delivery in Britain post 1991  
In 1990 the Conservative administration introduced reforms to promote competition 
between health care suppliers by separating the roles of financer and supplier of health 
care services. Finance was still raised through general taxation, and was allocated to 
public agents who were responsible for purchasing health care for their populations.  Two 
types of purchaser were created:  District health authorities (DHAs), responsible for 
purchasing hospital services for the population in a given geographical area and General 
Practice Fund-Holders (GPFHs)
3, primary care physicians who bought a subset of 
elective care for their patients.  Health care services were provided by public and private 
suppliers, who competed for contracts with the purchasers.  Public hospitals, which were 
originally under the control of health authorities, became separate legal entities, NHS 
Trusts.  Contracting between purchasers and providers took place on an annual basis.  
Both sets of buyers were allocated funds from central government, to be spent on hospital 
care. DHAs were not free to carry over surpluses from one year to the next. GPFHs were 
allowed to retain surpluses provided that they invested them in their practices. Patients 
had relatively little choice of buyer of health care. This is because, in the UK system, they 
have little choice of family doctor.  Patients whose family doctor chose to become a 
                                                  
3 These were a self-selected group who cover the patients for whom they already provided primary care and 
are given a budget for a limited set of health services sold by providers.   6 
GPFH therefore had a purchaser that was a GPFH, while patients whose family doctors 
chose not to enter the scheme had a purchaser who was the DHA for the area in which 
they were resident.  
Prices of services were available to buyers. However, there was no published data on 
hospital quality. Limited data on quality of care in NHS trusts was first made publicly 
available in 1999
4.  Although purchasers were given the right to buy from whichever 
supplier of health care they wished, in practice almost all care purchased by NHS 
purchasers was bought from NHS Trusts. Relatively little business went to the (limited in 
size and scope) private health care sector. NHS Hospitals competed with other hospitals 
to secure contracts from buyers. Given the importance of location in the provision of 
medical services, competition was primarily within geographical areas. Some of the 
competition took the form of sales of specific services on a cost per case basis, but most 
of the competition took place through annual negotiations over contracts for blocks of 
services, including accident and emergency services. In setting prices of these contracts, 
Trusts were heavily regulated.  They were supposed to set price equal to average costs, to 
earn a certain return on assets, and were not able to carry surpluses across financial years 
(Propper 1995). However, in spite of these regulation, there is evidence that there is scope 
for competition from the location of hospitals (see Appleby et al. 1994, and our own 
measures below) and, that faced with very low margins between revenues and costs, 
Trusts had incentives to compete with each other for contracts (Propper 1996).  
Documenting actual competition is more difficult, and relies to a large extent on 
comments by policy analysts and market participants. Le G rand (1999), writing after 
1997, argues that the internal market failed to create competition since trusts had both 
little incentive and little opportunity to compete.   Further, purchasers were heavily 
constrained and could not switch providers easily.  H e states that they were "under 
considerable pressure, both from central government and local interests not to destabalise 
local providers by any abrupt changes in their purchasing strategies".   Earlier 
                                                  
4 These data were 30 day in-hospital death rates (from surgery, AMI and FNF),  rates of discharge 
following a stroke or FNF and rates of emergency readmission within 28 days of discharge  from hospital. 
See (www.doh.gov.uk)    7 
commentators did not all share this view.  Ranade (1994) presents evidence that 
purchasers were willing to move business from their main suppliers, albeit to a limited 
extent.   She concluded from a survey held between December 1991 and January 1992 
that 62% of DHA's were planning to cease a contract that existed the previous year and 
71% to contract with a new provider.    She states that "this may be enough to achieve 
significant behavioural change in service providers".    Ham (1996) echoes this pointing 
out how "experience in the NHS since 1991 shows that it is not necessary for purchasers 
to move large volumes of contracts on a regular basis for changes in behaviour to occur.  
Both health authorities and fundholders have demonstrated that even small shifts can 
make a difference, sending out a signal that a purchaser means business and creating an 
incentive for providers to keep the cost and quality of their services permanently under 
review." 
For the first four or so years after the publication of `Working for Patients' the 
Department of Health actively promoted competition, for example, setting up structures 
to regulate anti-competitive behaviour.  In 1994 the Department of Health issued a 
document to all Trusts and Health Authorities entitled “National Responsibilities, Local 
Freedoms” that sets out a merger and anti-competition policy for NHS hospitals.   Crilly 
(2001) notes that "although the market did not work the 1991 reforms were, nevertheless, 
successful in introducing a competitive spirit through the survival instinct born in Trusts".   
She highlights the fact that although the 1991 reforms did not create a real market, trusts 
believed that they were operating in a competitive environment. As late as 1996 a senior 
physician wrote in a letter to the British Medical Journal  "Competition is a powerful 
factor in many clinical and managerial decisions.  `Business opportunities' (the attempt to 
take work from colleagues) determine who is seen and how quickly; clinical practice 
shifts to emulate what 'competitors' (colleagues) offer whether or not it is considered to 
be the best or most cost effective practice; and even the drafting of a new disciplinary 
code is influenced by the desire to 'protect' (hide) 'commercially sensitive information' 
(the fact that a doctor is the subject of disciplinary action) from competitors." The 
experience of clinicians, managers and patients involved in the work of the NHS suggests 
that competition was real.    More support for the idea that trusts were actively competing 
with each other comes from the British Medical Association, which expressed concern   8 
that competition in the market for healthcare has meant that knowledge of medical 
breakthroughs was not shared as it should have been
5.  
So as the internal market developed, competition grew, though it could only grow in 
those markets in which there were sufficient numbers of hospitals for it to exist.   
However, from 1995 or so there was growing concern over the effectiveness of the 
internal market.   Hacket (1996) noted hospitals were "struggling to determine a long-
term strategic direction for their organisations in response to the competitive pressures 
generated by the NHS reforms".  There was some concern that constraints on hospital 
managers’ behaviour limited the gains from competition (Le Grand et al 1998).   Health 
ministers began to "place less emphasis on competition and instead stress the need for 
partnership in the NHS"  (Ham 1996).  In 1995 the then Secretary of State for Health 
praised the merits of collaboration and planning instead of encouraging competition.    
This was endorsed by her successor, most notably in a letter to the chairs of trusts and 
health authorities. 
In 1997, the government changed and the incoming Labour administration sought to build 
on these sentiments and bring about ideological change.  It issued policy documents that 
stressed the promotion of "co-operation over competition" (Department of Health 1997).   
While retaining the split between buyers and sellers this document gave signals that 
competition for services was less important post-1998 than prior to 1997.   The key 
proposals included the setting up of "locality commissioning groups" which were 
intended to end competition between suppliers, instead emphasising collectively set 
priorities and planned spending. 
 
In summary, on the supply side, the hospital market in the UK is characterised by 
monopolistic competition. The cost of travel for patients, and the lack of full information 
on the buyers’ part, means hospitals are not perfect substitutes.  But very few hospitals 
have no competitors with 30 minute travel distance (Propper, 1996).  On the buyer side, 
                                                  
5 Reform Proposals for the NHS and the `old' internal market (Nov 15 1997), BBC News Report 
   9 
buyers are not individual patients but agents (the GPFHs and the DHAs) who place 
contracts on behalf of patients. These agents are cash constrained, and have relatively 
hard budget constraints in the case of DHAs, and incentives to make savings from their 
budgets in the case of GPFHs. Patients are interested in quality, since they pay zero price 
at point of demand as care is free.  Agents, on the other hand, are interested in price, and, 
to the extent that they are constrained by the wishes of patients, also quality. So the net 
effect is that agents are interested in both price and quality, though they may give 
considerably less weight to the latter if there is no monitoring of their behaviour (since 
patients can not change agents very easily and there is little scope for ‘voice')
6.  
 
(b) Hypotheses and our econometric approach 
This market can broadly be characterised as one in which the demand curve facing each 
hospital is downward sloping.  The impact of competition in such a market has been 
analysed for a profit-maximising hospital whose demand is a function of price and quality 
by Dranove & Satterthwaite (1998). They show the impact on  quality depends on the 
effect of competition on the price and quality elasticities of demand. If competition 
increases the price elasticity alone, then the effect of competition will be to decrease 
quality. If competition increases the sensitivity to both price and quality, then the effect 
on quality is ambiguous. If competition increases the elasticity of the quality signal more 
than that of the price signal then quality will rise. If quality signals are measured with 
greater noise than price signals this will decrease the elasticity with regard to quality 
relative to the elasticity with regard to price. Investigation of the effect of a change in one 
of the parameters (say the cost of producing a unit of quality) on one choice variable will 
result in biased results unless the analysis takes into account the fact that both are chosen 
simultaneously. So the typical approach in the literature to the analysis of competition, 
which is a single equation estimation of costs, price or price-cost mark up on competition 
may give biased results. Similarly (though less commonly estimated in the literature) 
single equation estimates of quality on costs and competition will give biased results. 
                                                  
6 Kessler and McClellan’s (1998) study uses data on Medicare patients where there is no price competition.   10 
The Dranove and Sattherthwaite model assumes profit maximisation and that hospitals 
are free to set price and quality. While there is no profit in the UK case, surpluses can be 
used within year for NHS hospitals, and deficits were seen as evidence of failure on the 
part of hospital management
7. But UK hospitals were regulated with respect to price. 
Prices for each service were not set by a central government body, as in the DRG based 
system used for Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement used in the USA. Instead, hospitals 
were required to set price equal to average cost for each service. At a specialty level there 
is evidence that hospitals were probably not bound by this rule (Propper 1996, Propper et 
al 1998), as abiding by the rule is difficult to observe at this level. However, at the whole 
hospital level the rule probably did more or less bind, as at this level it is easy to monitor.  
If price equals average cost then hospitals can choose only choose quality (equivalent to 
cost). Quality will again be a function of both price and quality elasticities. The impact of 
differences in competition on quality could go either way: competition forces hospitals to 
cut prices and cut quality, or to improve quality. However, the simultaneity of price and 
quality choice is no longer an issue.  To investigate the relationship between quality and 
competition, the appropriate reduced form model is to regress quality on competition and 
other factors affecting cost, where competition is hypothesised to affect both price and 
quality elasticities. The expected impact of competition would depend on the effect of 
competition on the two elasticities and the relative noise in the two signals. This is the 
approach taken here. Given that price information was available and that quality 
indicators were not, our prior is that given the way this market was set up, competition is 
likely to reduce quality.  
Competition in health care markets is geographically defined. It therefore primarily 
changes only as new hospitals enter a geographical area or exit through mergers or 
closures.  There was both merger and the establishment of new hospitals during the NHS 
internal market. However, there were very few entrants into the provision of accident and 
emergency services and most of the new hospitals that were established were the result of 
a split-off of a specialist unit providing care for the mentally ill and for long term care 
from a hospital providing a large range of services, including accident and emergency 
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services. Similarly, there were mergers, but most of these were between specialist units 
and hospitals providing accident and emergency services.
8   Therefore, to a large extent, 
the number of competitors in any one local market was fixed over time.   
However, competition over time was not fixed, as competition in this market was both 
introduced and influenced by policy change.   The internal market reforms introduced 
competition into a large public organisation but was intended to apply to the wider 
healthcare market, that is, to include private (hospitals) and self-employed (GPFHs) 
players.  We use changes in policy on competition to identify the impact of competition 
in a data set of hospitals covering 1991- 1999. We divide hospitals into two groups: those 
located in markets in which competition was possible and the rest. (The specific measures 
of competition that we used are discussed below.) We interact this dummy variable with 
time. The interaction identifies the effect of competition. We also allow for hospital fixed 
effects.  We estimate:  
( ) ( ) it i i t it it comp t I X t m x m t d b g a
t + + = + + + = ￿ = * .
1999
1991         (1) 
where m is the mortality from AMI for hospital  i at time t, g(t) is a set of time dummies, 
Xit is a vector of observed hospital characteristics which vary over time (primarily case 
mix), I(.) is the indicator function with value 1 if true and 0 otherwise, comp is a dummy 
indicating whether or not the geographical area the hospital is located can support 
competition, mi is a unobserved hospital effect and  xit is random noise.  
This is essentially a difference-in-difference  estimator, in which the impact of 
competition is derived from comparison of the death rates of hospitals in years in which 
competition was possible with their behaviour when it was not (1991) with the behaviour 
of hospitals where competition was not possible in any years. Given the discussion 
below, we might expect the coefficient on the time interaction to increase prior to 1997 
and fall thereafter. As for all difference-in-difference estimators, we have to assume that 
the control group do not change to being the treated, and that any macro changes affect 
                                                  
8 Between 1991 and 1997 there were around major 12 reconfigurations that led to a within area reduction of 
one hospital providing accident and emergency services, and there were less than 5 that increased the 
number of such providers by one.   12 
both groups equally. In our case, the treated and the controls are defined by geographical 
location and hence groups are fixed, given the negligible amount of entry and exit. We 
allow for common macro changes through a set of fully flexible time dummies.  
Treatment for AMI has been subject to technological change in various OECD countries 
(McClellan and Kessler (2001)), and this is captured by the time dummies.   
Use of a fixed effects estimator controls for the impact of any fixed observed or 
unobserved factors that may be spatially associated with competition but are not due to 
competition.  So a fixed effect approach controls for the possible correlation between 
location and unobservable patient health: for example, the positive correlation between 
inner city location and a population with poorer health. It will also control for differential 
investment in technology by size of hospital. Controls will still be needed for factors that 
may change over time.   
In summary, if competition has an effect what we would expect to see is an increasing 
divergence between the outcomes for hospitals located in places where competition is 
possible and where it is not for the period 1992 to 1995 or 1996, and a decreasing 
divergence thereafter.  
 
4. Data 
(a) Measurement of Quality 
The issue of how to measure quality in health care is long-standing and contentious.  
Various potential proxies for quality have been put forward, including length of stay and 
mortality rates. Since the United States Health Care Financing Administration began 
publishing hospital mortality data in 1986 a large literature has appeared on its usefulness 
and reliability as a measure of quality: Thomas and Hofer (1998) provide a 
comprehensive review. They cite evidence that poor quality care increases patients risk of 
mortality and that, on average the quality of care provided in hospitals identified as high-
mortality rate outliers is poorer than that of low-mortality rate outliers, but conclude from 
the existing evidence that when used as a measure of quality for individual hospitals, risk-
adjusted mortality rates can be seriously inaccurate. However, more recent work by   13 
McClellan and Staiger (1999) argues that suitably adjusted measures of death rate 
correlate well with other measures of quality.   
In this paper we use death rates from acute myocardial infarction (AMI). AMI was 
chosen on the basis that the nature of such care is, in part, under the control of hospital 
management and senior physicians within the hospitals, and so outcomes are in part a 
choice decision of the hospital. Thomas et al (1993) model mortality risks from AMI 
(amongst other measures) in the US, and use a database of quality findings to determine 
whether the ratio of observed to expected deaths relates validly to quality. Their results 
provide some support for AMI as a quality indicator.  AMI has also been used in recent 
studies of quality and competition in the US (Kessler & McClellan 1998).  To derive our 
death rates we use UK panel data from the hospital episode statistics (HES) database over 
the financial years 1991/2 through 1999/00.   The measure of AMI deaths we use is a ‘30-
day’ rate and measures in-hospital deaths within 30 days of emergency admission with a 
myocardial infarction for patients aged 50 and over
9, 10. Use of emergency admissions 
reduces the problem of patient selection.  30-day rates, adjusted to reduce noise, have 
been shown to be good predictors of 7 day, and one-year death rates in US data 
(McClellan and Staiger, 1999).  
One problem with using mortality as an indicator of hospital quality is that death rates are 
quite variable over time trust-by-trust, reflecting, in part, the issue of small denominators 
(hospitals may treat relatively few patients for this condition in any one year).    This 
noise in the measures of death rates can lead to misclassification of the quality of 
hospitals.  This is a  problem  that  is common in the analysis of AMI death rates 
(McClellan and Staiger, 1999)  
One indication of the amount of noise is to examine the change in ranking of hospitals 
over time. Table 1 takes the “best” (in the lowest 10% of death rates) hospitals in the first 
                                                  
9 Deaths occuring after transfer to another provider are credited to the provider where the patient was first 
admitted. Deaths following discharge are omitted. Deaths following readmission are not included.  
10 Many of the actions to reduce deaths from emergency admissions for AMI need to be taken soon after an 
attack, and so the performance of a hospital in terms of AMI reflects the performance of its accident and 
emergency unit. Around half the patients admitted to an acute English hospital are admitted through the 
accident and emergency department, so this quality measure is an important aspect of hospital quality.     14 
year of the data window (1991/2) and examines their ranking in later years 1993/4, 
1995/6 and 1997/8.  The table shows that of hospitals ranked as best in 1991/2, 45% are 
still ranked as in the best 10% in 1993/4, 33.3% are still in this group in 1995/6 and 
13.64% are still in this group in 1997/8.   Only 5% of the hospitals ranked as best in 
1991/2 had shifted into the worst group after 2 years, 14.29% had shifted into the worst 
group after four years and 4.55% had moved into this group after 6 years. Mean mortality 
difference between these hospitals and all others was negative and significant in 1993/4 
and 1997/8.  McClellan and Staiger (1999) present this analysis for a sample of nearly 
4000 hospitals in the USA. Our data exhibit less variability than the US data. For the US 
data, hospitals in the best ranking were, two years later, nearly as likely to be ranked 
amongst the worst (14.7%) as amongst the best (16.7%).  Average mortality amongst 
these hospitals was in fact higher than the average of all others after 2 years.  
McClellan and Staiger (1999) suggest a method of filtering out the noise in annual 
estimates. They have at their disposal 10 years of data at patient level. Using their 
‘filtered’ estimates they find that 52% of hospitals ranked in the best group were still 
ranked in the top decile two years later, and  less than one percent were ranked in the 
bottom decile. Clearly, our data lie somewhere between the US unadjusted data and the 
filtered data. This may be due to the fact that the hospitals in our data set are on average 
larger than those in the USA. The mean annual number of admissions for AMI in our data 
set is 380, while in the US sample used in McClellan and Staiger the average hospital 
admits between 50-60 AMI patients per year. 
The method we use to reduce the noise inherent in our annual death rate measures is in 
similar spirit to the shrinkage technique proposed originally by Stein (1955).   We obtain 
a ‘shrunken’ estimate for hospital j in year t by calculating a weighted average of the 
hospitals own observed death rate in year t (Mjt) and the mean of the other hospitals in the 
sample in year t (Mt).    The shrunken death rate estimator can be expressed as follows: 
M
)
jt =  MjtSj + Mt (1- Sj )  (2) 
 
The shrinkage weight for hospital j (Sj) reflects the level of reliability in hospital j’s point 
estimate.   It is equal to s
b/(sj
w +  s
b), where s
b is the between group (hospital) variance   15 
and sj
w is the within group (hospital) variance.   The less noisy the death rate series for a 
given hospital the lower the proportion of total variance that is within hospital variance 
and thus the larger is the shrinkage weight for that hospital.  The larger the shrinkage 
weight the closer is the estimate to the hospitals observed death rate.  When the within 
hospital variance is relatively high (e.g. when the hospital admits few patients) and when 
then there is less variation in death rates across hospitals the shrinkage weight for hospital 
j will be close to zero.  The smaller this coefficient the more weight is given to the mean 
mortality rate across hospitals – and hence the greater the “shrinkage” towards the overall 
mean  (an estimate in which there is more confidence). 
 
(b) Measures of competition 
Our measures of competition are geographically based since treatment for AMI requires 
the physical presence of the patient at the hospital. These are calculated only once for 
each hospital, as there is relatively  little  change in the  number of hospitals or the 
population  of an area in the nine-year window. To derive these requires a definition of 
each hospital’s ‘catchment’ area.  In general it is argued that administrative boundaries do 
not measure catchment areas well (e.g. Kessler and McClellan, 1998), and the obvious 
administrative area in the UK case, the health authority,  is also likely to  be a poor 
candidate, especially in more competitive areas. The reforms were introduced in part 
because health authority boundaries were not co-terminous with patient flows, leading to 
cross-boundary flows that were not easily remunerated in the pre-reform NHS. Instead, 
we  use a definition of catchment area that reflects patient costs. Any measure that is 
based on actual hospital choices may produce biased estimators: unobservable hospital 
heterogeneity in hospital quality may affect individual choice and may also affect the 
mortality of the hospitals. For this reason, the measures used in our analysis are based on 
potential, rather than actual, patient travel times to each hospital. 
In contrast with  data used in recent US analyses, we do  not have access to individual 
patient addresses. Instead, we assume that individuals are potential patients of any trust 
that they are close to. To be specific, we draw a boundary around each trust that defines 
the area within 30 minutes drive from the trust. Clearly, the choice of 30 minutes is   16 
arbitrary. This boundary delineates the ‘service area’ or catchment area of the trust. The 
details of the construction of this are as follows. We extracted a postcode for each Trust 
from NHS Yearbooks, and then converted this to a map grid reference using  Postzon 
software. This allows us to locate each trust on an electronic map; we then superimpose 
on that the road network11. Using assumed speeds for three different road types, we can 
locate a set of points exactly 30 minutes drive time away. Joining these up gives us a 
catchment area for each hospital. Finally, we superimpose these with the small electoral 
area boundaries (wards). These are 1991 census wards, of which there are approximately 
8000, compared to some 250 trusts. We tag a ward as belonging to the service area of a 
particular trust if any portion of the ward falls within the 30-minute zone.  
The simplest measure of competition is the number of trusts located in the catchment area 
of hospital j: 
j j T C =
0  
This measures the number of potential competitors that  j faces, but doesn’t take into 
account the population to be served by the hospital. The smaller this population for a 
given number of trusts, the more spare capacity and so the larger the potential amount of 
competition. To allow for this, we normalise the number of trusts in an area by the 
population of the area (Pj) 
j j j P T C =
1 .  
The higher this is, the more competitive the environment.  
Our  third measure  of competition  measures the extent to which the population of a 
hospital’s catchment area can choose between different hospitals.  First, we determine the 
population of the wards that fall into each hospital’s catchment area and the number of 
trusts each ward population has within a 30-minute radius. Then for each trust j we can 
calculate the share of the total population in all the wards it serves that have a choice 
between different numbers of hospitals.  That is, for each particular hospital we calculate 
the proportion of its catchment area population that have access to only that hospital, or 
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that can access only 2  hospitals etc.  This  yields a distribution funciton, denoted  C
2
j, 
which we can cut in a number of different ways in our empirical analysis. Note that, 
unlike measure C
1
j, this second measure is independent of the size of the population in the 
catchment area. 
The measures are obviously related, but are by no means identical. Fig. 1 presents 
histograms of the distribution of the three measures of competition over hospitals in the 
sample. Fig. 1(a) presents measure C 0, Fig. 1(b) presents C1, and Figs. 1(c)-(e) present 
three cuts of C
2. The first cut is the proportion of the hospital’s catchment area population 
that can reach at least three hospitals. The second is the proportion that can reach at least 
6 hospitals and the third is the proportion that can reach at least 11 hospitals. 
The measures show quite a range in competitiveness of hospital market.  The histogram 
of C
0 shows the number of hospitals in each hospital’s catchment area.  There is a 
relatively large proportion of hospitals that have fewer than 11  competitors in their 
service area, while a small number of trusts have lots of competitors, with the largest 
number being 46.    The distribution of C
1 shows a similar pattern to C
0, but also shows 
that the effect of standardising the number of competitors in the catchment area by the 
population of the areas is to shift more weight to the bottom end of the distribution. Fig. 
1(c) illustrates that travel times are such that lack of potential choice is relatively rare: for 
the vast majority of hospitals, the proportion of their service area population that can 
reach 3 or more hospitals (the first cut of C
2)
  is close to 1. This distribution is also 
slightly bimodal.  Fig. 1(d) shows the distribution of the second cut of C
2. This is clearly 
bimodal: there is a large group of hospitals that have a very high proportion of their 
service area population able to reach at least 6 trusts whilst there is also a fairly large 
group that have a very low proportion. Fig. 1(e) shows a very similar distribution for the 
third cut of C
2. It is even more bimodal, and has more weight in the lower tail of the 
distribution. The proportion of a hospital's catchment area population that can reach 11 or 
more hospitals is generally either close to zero or close to 1. 
In table 2 we categorise these competition measures into 3 quantiles and present the 
correlations between them. There is a relatively high correlation between all the measures 
with the exception of C
1. The effect of the normalisation of C
1 by the service area   18 
population is that there are some areas that have both a low number of hospitals and a low 
population and therefore fall into the upper two thirds of the distribution of C
1. This 
reduces the correlation between this and the other measures of competition.   
 
(c) Controls  
We exploit the panel nature of our data and estimate fixed effects models. Therefore 
several of the controls that we would want in a cross sectional analysis get absorbed into 
the fixed effect. Our time-varying controls are controls for case-mix (we do not have data 
on patient co-morbidity so use the distribution of AMI admissions by age and by gender) 
and controls for size/throughput  (measured by  the number of total admissions, and the 
number of emergency AMI admissions). Higher volumes of patients have been shown to 
be associated with better success rates.  To compare our work to our previous cross-
sectional analyses (Propper  et al 2002) we can examine the relationship between the 
estimated fixed effects and observed, fixed, characteristics of the hospital and its 
catchment area.  The fixed characteristics we measure include dummies for  whether the 
Trust is a teaching hospital, or a heart specialist, or is in London, region dummies, and 
proxies for population health of the catchment area. Teaching hospitals are often thought 
to have better facilities but also to attract harder cases. The London dummy is to ensure 
that any special features of hospitals in the capital do not drive our results. The definition 
of region is the geographically based administrative region of the NHS.
12 As controls for 
the severity of the potential population of the hospital  we use area (1991 Census ward) 
characteristics that might affect the general level of health of the potential patients of the 
trust. For each ward, we have all cause mortality and AMI mortality (both split by age 
and gender), and the proportion of the population with long-term limiting illness. We 
have demographic data on the age and gender structure of the population. We also have 
data on unemployment and inactivity rates (by gender) and measures of wealth or 
deprivation such as proportion of homes owner-occupied, or proportion of homes without 
indoor bathrooms. These measures of deprivation are quite collinear, and in our analyses 
                                                  
12 These are not fully coterminous with, but overlap considerably with, other geographically-based 
definitions of English regions.   19 
we use only a subset of these.
13  
Table A1 provides details of the dependent variable, the measures of competition and the 
controls. Our data set contains 252 hospitals: this is the population of all English hospitals 
that provide any acute service.   Where a trust admits less than 10 AMI cases in any one 
year we exclude this datapoint from the analysis. We do this as using such small 
denominators in the calculation of the death rate means that very few deaths can create a 
high overall rate.   After exclusions because of missing controls and small admissions the 
sample size is 226 hospitals.  Details of all data sources are provided in table A2.  
 
5. Results 
(a) The effect of competition 
Figure 2 presents the aggregate AMI death rate over the 8 years of the sample. This 
shows a clear downward trend in death rates in our data. This downward trend is evident 
in the data for a number of OECD countries and has been attributed to the adoption of 
new technology in the treatment of AMI (McClellan & Kessler, 2001). The trend in 
figure 2 is not dissimilar to the trend for Scotland during the 1990s.
14  
Figure 3 splits the hospitals in the sample on the basis of three quantiles of competition 
measure C 1. Those hospitals in the bottom third of this distribution face little/no 
competition throughout the whole of the period 1991-99 (for example, 18% are 
monopolies) while the rest faced some.  The figure plots the average death rate by each 
quantile for 1991-1999. The results show a more or less continuous decline in death rates 
for hospitals in the least competitive markets. Death rates for those hospitals in the more 
competitive markets do not fall much up to 1995 and then fall more sharply from then 
onwards, with a blip in 1998
15.  The rates for the two higher competition groups are quite 
                                                  
13 There are several studies of England and the UK which show strong relationships between measures of 
mortality and deprivation at a local level (e.g. Eames et al, 1993, Ben-Schlomo et al, 1996, Drever and 
Whitehead, 1995). 
14 See McGuire and Windmeijer (2002).  
15 This blip in 1998 remains in all of the results reported below, and may be due in part to an unusual cause. 
Carroll et al (2002) show that the World Cup soccer match between England and Argentina in June 1998 
resulted in a 25% increase in admissions for AMI compared to neighbouring days. Whilst this study did not   20 
similar. So these raw data show first a divergence between death rates of hospitals facing 
little/no competition and those facing some (those in the top two thirds of the 
distribution), then a convergence from 1996. This pattern in the raw data corresponds 
closely to the policy introduction of competition, its promotion up to the mid 1990s and 
its reduction in importance thereafter.  
Table 3 presents estimates of the difference in death rates between non-competitive and 
competitive hospitals.  Competition is defined in three ways: as dummy variables based 
on measure C
1, based on the total number of hospitals in a service area, and based  on the 
measure C
2.  In columns 1 and 2 hospitals are classified as facing competition if they are 
in the top two thirds of C
1 and as facing no competition otherwise.  Column 1 uses all 
hospitals, column 2 omits those hospitals, which have no competitors in their catchment 
area but have small populations and so fall into the top 66 percent of competition measure 
C
1. In column three all hospitals which have at least one other hospital in their catchment 
area are classified as facing competition. Columns 4 -6 are based on competition measure 
C
2, with the number of hospitals classified as facing competition falling from column 4 to 
6. In column 4 hospitals for which 100 percent of their catchment areas population can 
reach 3 or more hospitals are classified as facing competition. In column 5 hospitals for 
which 100 percent of their catchment areas population can reach 6 or more hospitals are 
classified as facing competition. In column 6 hospitals for which 100 percent of their 
catchment areas population can reach  11 or more hospitals are classified as facing 
competition. The proportion of hospitals classified as facing competition is 44 percent of 
the sample in column 4, 21 percent in column 5 and 7 percent in column 6.  
Equation (1) is estimated using these different definitions of competition. The impact of 
competition is identified from the interaction of the year dummies with the competition 
dummy. The omitted year is 1991, the year of the introduction of the competition policy. 
Our prior is an increase in the impact of competition upto the mid-1990s and a fall 
thereafter. We initially estimated (1) using fully flexible time dummies. Tests on those 
                                                                                                                                                    
examine AMI death rates, a related Dutch study did find increased AMI mortality around Netherlands- 
France soccer match in 1996.   21 
dummies indicated that we could not reject a simple linear trend; therefore we impose 
that for the results presented here. 
The results, with the single exception of column (4), support this prior.  The coefficients 
on the interactions of year dummies with competition rise from 1992 to plateau in 1995 
and 1996, then fall in 1997, rise in most of the columns in 1998 (see footnote 15) and 
then fall in 1999. They are generally not significantly different from zero in the early one 
or two years of the operation of the competition policy, or in 1997 and 1999, when the 
policy was beginning to be reversed, but are well defined f or the mid-1990s and 
sometimes for 1998. A clear time trend is present in all columns and is very similar 
across all definitions of competition. 
The estimates also show a clear pattern across the different measures of competition/no 
competition. The estimates of columns (1), (2) and (5) are broadly the same. The 
estimates of column (3) are smaller. In this column, no-competition is defined as the 
presence of only one seller in a market, whereas the definitions used in the other columns 
include hospitals with more competitors in the group defined as facing no competition.  It 
may be the case that monopoly itself is associated with higher death rates.  In contrast, 
the estimates of column (6) are approximately twice the size of those in columns (1), (2) 
and (5). In this column, we define competition as existing only if patients can reach many 
hospitals; i.e. there are many potential sellers in the market. Clearly, the effect of this 
high competition on death rates is large. 
The exception to these results, column (4), is probably due to the definition of 
competition. Having a catchment area in which all the population can reach 3 or more 
trusts within 30 minutes does not appear to distinguish between the competitive and the 
non-competitive: the definition splits the sample into two more or less equal size groups 
and so does not allow us to identify either monopolies or those hospitals where a great 
deal of competition is possible (policy permitting). 
Figure 4 plots the coefficients on the time*competition interactions and their standard 
errors from all the estimates in Table 3. This shows that the divergence in death rates 
between hospitals facing some- and no-competition reaches a plateau in the mid 1990s, 
then falls, rises in 1998 and then falls in 1999. With the exception of the rise in 1998 the   22 
pattern supports our hypothesis that the impact of competition, where it could operate for 
geographic reasons, would increase and then operate more weakly after the election of 
the Labour government in 1997.   
The pattern in the competition*time coefficients using the fully flexible time dummies 
was the same as that reported in Table 3. The coefficients were very similar in size, but 
were obviously estimated with less precision (the results are available from the authors).  
The fixed characteristics of hospitals that are associated with high death rates can be 
examined by regressing the fixed effects from the estimates in Table 3 (the mi in equation 
(1)) against fixed characteristics of the hospitals, including their catchment areas.  These 
results (not presented here)
16 show that hospitals with higher numbers of beds and which 
are heart specialists have lower death rates, that there are no differences between teaching 
and non-teaching hospitals, that there are regional differences in the hospital fixed effects 
and there is some indication that hospitals located in areas of higher social deprivation 
have lower death rates.  These differences are the same as those found in the cross-
sectional analyses of AMI death rates presented in Propper et al (2002). 
 
(b) The impact of case mix 
The results in Table 3 control for case mix differences which are fixed over time, but do 
not control for changes in case mix. If case-mix changes as a response to competition, the 
differences in death rates might be due in part to differences in patient type and our 
finding that death rates are higher in more competitive areas may therefore be the result 
of hospitals which are in located in low competition markets receiving fewer more ill 
patients. While this may occur for elective patients, it seems less likely to occur in the 
case of emergency AMI admissions. Hospitals that face few competitors would seem to 
be less, rather than more, able to refuse patients.  In our sample, hospitals that have 
higher admissions for AMI are more likely to be low competition, suggesting that this, in 
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fact, is the case so perhaps case mix is not a major issue
17.  However, while risk-adjusted 
death rates are not yet published for the UK, to have some control for case mix, the model 
was re-estimated including controls for the proportion of patients admitted each year in 
36 age-gender groups.
18 Inclusion of these controls slightly increased the standard errors 
on some of the competition*time interactions, but the controls themselves were not 
statistically significant.  
These controls are admittedly somewhat crude. While we cannot make more detailed 
adjustment, one test of robustness of the results is to estimate the model on one particular 
age group only. Table 4 presents the estimates of model (1) for individuals aged 50-69, 
males and females separately. These two groups account for a high proportion of all AMI 
admissions: 29% (males) and 11% (females) of total AMI admissions. The measure of 
competition used is that from column 2 of table 3. The table shows that the results for 
males are very similar to the overall results: competition appears to raise death rates and 
there is a significant downward time trend. Given the importance of this group to total 
AMI admissions, this is perhaps not surprising. The results for female are rather different: 
while the downward time trend exists there appears to be no impact of competition.  
 
(c) The effect of size 
Table 3 includes a control for activity, total hospital admissions. This is weakly 
associated with lower death rates, but the coefficient is not well defined. We found no 
impact of AMI activity or of hospital size (number of beds). This contrasts with a 
literature that suggests practice makes perfect in medical care, but is a finding that is 
similar to that found in the earlier analyses of English data in Propper et al (2002).
19 
However, it is possible that hospitals with different levels of activity or size respond 
differently to competition. To explore this, we split the sample on the basis of average 
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others is 342.  
18 Male and female AMI admissions are broken down into 5-year age bands (age 0-4 through to age 80-84, 
with an additional band for the 85 plus age group) 
19 Given our estimates use panel data, average size/activity is differenced out, and we might not expect 
much of an impact from year-on-year fluctuations in activity.   24 
bed size (a measure of size and to some extent also activity), of average AMI admissions 
and of average total admissions
20.   The measure of competition used is that of column 2 
of table 3.   The results, in table 5, show that, while not necessarily well defined, the 
impact of competition on death rates appears to be less in hospitals with more activity. 
There is also some indication that the general fall in death rates is lower in smaller 
hospitals: for all measures of size the coefficient on time is smaller in magnitude for the 
smaller hospitals, though the coefficients are not statistically different. The final column 
of table 5 uses the available  data to investigate whether the impact of competition 
differed across hospitals facing differential operating pressures. As a measure of such 
pressure we use the ratio of total admissions to total number of doctors in a hospital. 
Hospitals with a high ratio might be viewed as being under greater pressure.  
Interestingly, and perhaps contrary to expectations, the results indicate that it is the group 
of hospitals who are under less pressure who have a stronger association of higher death 
rates with competition. 
 
(d) Other possible explanations 
Our results show that the coefficients on time*competition dummies follows the rise and 
demise of competition due to changes in competition policy.  However, there may be 
other variables that follow the same pattern and so potentially account for our findings. 
One potential suspect is the level of resources available to buyers of health care.   
The NHS is a state-funded system, and budgets for hospital care are allocated according 
to a needs-based resource allocation formula.  From 1991 to 1995 resources were 
allocated by central government to Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) on the basis of 
the population within their geographic area.  RHAs had autonomy over how to allocate 
their money down to the buyers of health care, the DHAs.  From 1995, after the abolition 
of the regional tier, the government allocated, under the same principle, directly to DHAs.   
There were changes in the allocation formula in both 1991 and 1995.  From 1976 to 1990 
the government distributed the  hospital budget to regions according to an allocation 
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(known as RAWP) based on population, adjusted for variations in age structure, health 
needs and costs.   In 1991, the formula was changed
21. The main change was to replace 
all-age standardised mortality  rates (SMRs) with SMRs for only the under 75s, along 
with a reduction of the weight given to SMRs in the formula from 1.0 to 0.5.  
Implementation of this change would shift resources away from RHAs with high SMRs 
and higher SMRs for older people, and so potentially (depending on RHA allocation 
policy) to shift resources between DHAs in the same way.  In April 1995 the  most 
significant change was the replacement of SMR as the sole proxy for morbidity, and 
therefore need (over and above age), with two separate needs indices for the acute and 
psychiatric sectors
22. Implementation of this change would shift allocations to areas with 
higher need.  
Peacock and Smith (1995) isolated the impact of these changes in the definition of need 
by calculating the per capita allocations if resources had been allocated directly to DHAs 
based on the square root of the under-75 SMR and compared these with the per capita 
allocations to HAs if resources were allocated according to the 1995 formula.  We use 
these need indices to identify correlation between the level of competition and the level 
of need in 91 and in 95.  We find that, at both points, the needs index for health 
authorities located in competitive areas is, on average, significantly higher than for health 
authorities located in non-competitive areas.   We also examined the difference between 
the 95 needs index and the 91 needs index for each health authority.   If the 1995 formula 
measures need more accurately than the previous formula then this difference is a 
measure o f the extent to which the health authority was under-resourced (under the 
assumption that RHA's allocated money according to the formula).  We find that health 
authorities located in competitive areas would be, on average, the gainers from the 
change in the formula in 1995.  So, if health authorities in competitive areas were not 
                                                                                                                                                    
average total admissions are defined as the mean number across years 1991-1999.  
21  Assessment of need was based upon  a small area regression analysis of the 
determinants of variations in inpatient utilisation. 
22 The needs index for the acute sector included those variables found to be most heavily correlated with 
utilisation of acute services:  mortality rates within a given area, long-standing illness, the proportion of the 
elderly who were homebound, single-parent families, and unemployment.   26 
receiving enough resources for the need of their population during 91-95, with this 
situation being remedied thereafter, this could explain higher in-hospital AMI death rates 
in these areas in the early period.   
However, in practice, allocations to RHAs and DHAs were not based fully on the 
resource allocation formula. The formulae were used to obtain target allocations only.   
With respect to the 1991 formula, government policy was to move each RHA’s actual 
allocation towards its target over time. RHAs were responsible for allocation to DHAs, 
and were supposed to move DHAs to target.  The same gap between target and actual 
allocations applied post-1995 when funds were allocated directly to health authorities.  
Movements to target were very slow and so almost all actual DHA allocations were 
different to the target allocation prescribed by the formula for the period 1995-1999. 
Given these changes we need to control for hospital resources. One measure is total 
hospital income from contracts with all buyers and this is known for the period 1991-
1999. However, this measure is potentially endogenous.  One interpretation of a negative 
relationship between income per patient and the death rate is that higher hospital income 
allows for better quality of care.   But the line of causation might be just the reverse.  It 
could be that good hospitals with low death rates get more contracts and thus generate 
more income per patient.   In this case the coefficient on the income variable would be 
upwardly biased.  This endogeneity problem is likely to be less severe in the case of 
emergency AMI than in other specialties. Accident and emergency services were covered 
by block contracts negotiated annually rather than on a cost per case basis.    Hospitals 
who excelled in terms of their quality of care for AMI patients would not be rewarded 
with more money via additional contracts.   In addition, AMI patients make up only 
around 1 percent of total admissions and so AMI cases contribute little to overall level of 
hospital resources.  
Nevertheless, we wish to control for this potential endogeneity.  Given the structure of 
the NHS internal market, a good instrument for hospital income is the DHA allocation. 
Unfortunately, there is no data on  actual DHA allocations pre-1996 as money was 
allocated to RHAs. We therefore use RHA allocations per capita upto 1995 and DHAs 
allocations aggregated across DHAs to regions and divided by total population in the   27 
region post-1995. This variable has large spikes, common to all regions, first when the 
formula changed in 1995 and then again in 1999 after the Labour administration 
massively increased resources for the health service
23. To remove the impact of these 
spikes we replace the regional allocations with the residuals from a regression of regional 
allocations against time dummies. This removes the common spikes without altering any 
patterns in the interregional changes in allocations across time.  
We re-run our preferred model with each of these two measures of resources as an 
additional control. The results are presented in table 6 where, for the purposes of 
comparison, we also give the relevant results without these controls. (As there is some 
missing data for the two income series there are 2 columns of comparison results.)  
Results for hospital income per case is presented in column 1 and for regional resource 
allocation in column 3. It is clear from the table that our results are robust to inclusion of 
these controls. Resources per head do have the expected sign, but neither measure is well 
estimated and the coefficients on the competition*time dummies are unchanged after 
controlling for resources.  
To further investigate the impact of changes in needs we re-estimated the  model 
including under age 75 SMRs for men and women at health authority level as an 
additional control. The results are given in the last 2 columns of table 6. The coefficient 
on need has the expected sign and is well defined but again the pattern of coefficients on 
the competition measures is unchanged.  
In conclusion, on the basis of these analyses we conclude that the patterns in quality that 
we observe are not due to changes in either need or in the amount of resources allocated 
to hospitals.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The introduction of payer-driven competition has been one of the primary forms of health 
care reform advocated in the last two decades. It was introduced in the UK in 1991, on 
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the basis of relatively little evidence on the impact of such competition on either costs or 
quality. The emerging evidence from other health care systems suggests a mixed impact 
of competition on quality and the only study to date for the UK, which uses cross 
sectional data, suggests a small negative effect. The present paper uses data on a panel of 
all acute hospitals in the English NHS from 1991 to 1999. Use of panel data allows us to 
control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity between hospitals, which is important 
as hospitals differ in the quality of their staffing, plant and case-mix in ways that are 
difficult to capture in observed data. Competition in this market is geographically based, 
and in any one market there is relatively little entry and exit over the period. However, 
we exploit important changes in policy to identify the impact of competition. Competition 
was introduced in 1991, and was then encouraged by the government upto the middle 
1990s. In 1997 the incoming Labour administration changed this policy and actively 
encouraged co-operation rather than competition. These policy changes meant that in 
1991, regardless of the configuration of the local market, no competition was possible. 
Thereafter, competition was possible, but only in local markets in which there were 
sufficient numbers of suppliers. Post 1997,  although competition was possible, it was 
actively discouraged. Hence any impact of competition on quality should begin in 1992, 
increase upto the mid-1990s and tail off thereafter.  
Using this identification strategy, we use data on hospital death rates f rom acute 
myocardial infarction (AMI) within 30 days of admission to hospital as a measure of 
quality of care. This measure has been widely used in previous studies. We use 
geographical information to identify a hospital’s catchment area, defined in terms of 
travel times for potential patients. This information allows us to calculate several 
geographically based measures of competition, which are all based on potential, rather 
than actual, patient travel. This allows us to overcome criticisms of earlier studies which 
used measured based on either actual patient flows or administrative boundaries.   
We find  the impact of competition is to reduce quality. Hospitals located in more 
competitive areas have higher death rates during the period. The difference between those 
hospitals subject to competition and those not increased from 1992 to the mid-1990s and 
then fell (except for an unexplained blip in 1998). The estimated effect of competition is 
robust to different measures of competition and hospital volume.  The point estimates for   29 
1995 (the date at which competition was at its height) are of the order of a third of a 
standard deviation of the mean death rate for the whole sample. But this figure somewhat 
masks the full impact of competition. Death rates were higher in competitive areas in 
most years between 1992 and 1999. Cumulated over the entire period, the impact of 
competition in raising death rates more than matched the fall in death rates due to 
technological innovation. In other words, the negative impact of competition in the more 
competitive areas more than offsets the positive impact of technological change. 
However, our results do not mean that the introduction of competition had no benefits. 
Under the pricing regulations in force in the UK internal market, a fall in quality should 
be matched by a fall in costs and research has shown that competition in the UK health 
care market has been associated with lower costs and prices. And we have not found that 
all quality has fallen: our results show that the quality of one service, treatment for AMI, 
has fallen where competitive forces are high. While AMI death rates are widely used as a 
measure of hospital quality, hospitals are multi-product firms. AMI is part of accident and 
emergency services. These services need to be provided on a local basis. Given this, it is 
possible that hospitals in the UK competed by simultaneously lowering quality for 
services for which demand elasticity was low whilst raising quality where demand 
elasticity was higher. If this was the case, then our finding that competition is associated 
with lower quality for AMI is not necessarily incompatible with competition raising 
overall quality. There are no published data with which to investigate this hypothesis so 
this remains to be investigated in further research. 
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Data Appendix 
Table A1: Variable summary 
Variable name  Variable Details  Mean (s.e)  Median  Min  Max  
Shrunken AMI Death Rate   Weighted AMI emergency death rate.  Weights are 
# emergency admissions.  Source: Table A2 
0.212 (0.064)  0.207   0.026  1 
Shrunken FNF Death Rate  Weighted FNF emergency death rate.   Weights are 
# emergency admissions.  Source: Table A1 
0.076 (0.028)  0.073  0  0.185 
Competition Measure 1  (Number of trusts in catchment area/population of 
catchment area)  x 100,000 
0.538  0.519  0.240  1.724 
Competition Measure 2  Percentage of population in trust catchment area 
who can reach 3 or more trusts 
Percentage of population in trust catchment area 
who can reach 6 or more trusts 
Percentage of population in trust catchment area 





















% male residents with long-term 
limiting illness 
  11.928 (2.137)  11.756  7.838  17.021 
% households owner occupied    67.258 (6.370)  67.752  53.861  79.038 
% economically active males 
aged 16+ unemployed in 
catchment area 
  11.072 (2.885)  11.182  5.214  18.359 
Hospital is heart specialist  Hospital coded as heart specialist in 1996/7.    0.080 (0.271)  0  0  1 
Teaching hospital  Hospital coded as teaching hospital in 1996/7.    0.119 (0.325)  0  0  1 
London hospital  Hospital located in London.    0.124 (0.330)  0  0  1 
Total hospital admissions    42618.67 (211146.99)  39520  50  130986 
Total AMI emergency 
admissions 
  407.972 (213.354)  380  1  1357 
total admissions/no. of doctors    210.364 (89.429)  206.853  23.139  1223.533 
Total beds in hospital (1996)    651.938 (288.34)  625   74  1564 
   35 
 
Table A2: Data Sources 
Variable  Year  Source  Level provided 
AMI deaths & cases 
Standardised AMI death rates 
Total admissions 
 





Speciality and teaching dummies    Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
accounting (CIPFA) 
NHS Trust 
Hospital beds  1996/7  Department of Health  NHS Trust 
Region  1996/7  Hospital Year Book  NHS Trust 
Deprivation measures 
Population Measures  
1991  1991 Census of Population  Electoral Ward (Aggregated to trust level 
using Arcview) 
Detailed technical Annex of data set construction also available from authors 
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Estimates from Table 3, column 1
financial year






Estimates from Table 3, column 2
financial year






Estimates from Table 3, column 3
financial year






Estimates from Table 3, column 4
financial year




Estimates from Table 3, column 5
financial year





Estimates from Table 3, column 6
financial year





.08  39 
 
Table 1:  Comparisons of hospital rankings: 1991, 1993 and 1995 and 1997.   
Outcome measure: Raw AMI emergency death rates 50+ 
 
 
                       
              Ranked in best 10% 
              (lowest mortality rate) 
                        in 1991 
               





What percent were still ranked in the best 10%?      45% 
(lowest mortality rates) 
 
What percent were ranked in the worst 10%?      5% 
(highest mortality rates) 
 
Average difference in mortality rate from        0.0734** 
all other hospitals             (0.0176) 





What percent were still ranked in the best 10%?      33.33% 
(lowest mortality rates) 
 
What percent were ranked in the worst 10%?      14.29% 
(highest mortality rates) 
 
Average difference in mortality rate from        0.0425 
all other hospitals             (0.0271) 





What percent were still ranked in the best 10%?      13.64% 
(lowest mortality rates) 
 
What percent were ranked in the worst 10%?      4.5% 
(highest mortality rates) 
 
Average difference in mortality rate from        0.0421~ 
all other hospitals             (0.0238) 
(standard error of estimate) 
 
 
                   
*significant at 5%,  **significant at 1%   40 
 
Table 2: Correlation between competition measures 
  comp0  comp1  prop3p  prop6p  prop11p 
comp0  1.0000 
 
       




     






   



















* indicates P†0.05  41 
Table 3: Panel estimates of the impact of competition 
  Competition measure C1 
          
         (1)                         (2) 
No. of trusts in 
service area 
(3) 
Competition measure C2 
 
          (4)                       (5)                         (6) 
  top 2 quantiles of 
c1, all sample 
top 2 quantiles of c1, 
dropping monopolies 
with small population 
monopoly trusts 
versus all others 
100% of service 
area pop can reach 3 
or more trusts 
100% of service 
area pop can reach 6 
or more trusts 
100% of service 
area pop can reach 
11 or more trusts 
Time  -0.0078**  -0.0076**  -0.0085**  -0.0067**  -0.0074**  -0.0071** 
  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0008)  (0.0006)  (0.0005)  (0.0005) 
comp*92  0.0020  0.0096~  0.0048  0.0043  0.0142  0.0430* 
  (0.0050)  (0.0056)  (0.0042)  (0.0063)  (0.0095)  (0.0194) 
comp*93  0.0069  0.0152**  0.0076~  0.0049  0.0175*  0.0392** 
  (0.0048)  (0.0056)  (0.0041)  (0.0060)  (0.0089)  (0.0128) 
comp*94  0.0083~  0.0175**  0.0097*  0.0079  0.0240**  0.0443** 
  (0.0050)  (0.0055)  (0.0044)  (0.0059)  (0.0081)  (0.0131) 
comp*95  0.0135**  0.0239**  0.0153**  0.0090  0.0280**  0.0409** 
  (0.0050)  (0.0062)  (0.0047)  (0.0060)  (0.0083)  (0.0114) 
comp*96  0.0128*  0.0219**  0.0166**  0.0108~  0.0288**  0.0558** 
  (0.0053)  (0.0064)  (0.0051)  (0.0064)  (0.0087)  (0.0138) 
comp*97  0.0083  0.0175*  0.0108~  -0.0027  0.0168~  0.0283~ 
  (0.0058)  (0.0070)  (0.0057)  (0.0069)  (0.0086)  (0.0146) 
comp*98  0.0121*  0.0229**  0.0173**  0.0035  0.0250**  0.0355** 
  (0.0060)  (0.0074)  (0.0061)  (0.0070)  (0.0090)  (0.0131) 
comp*99  0.0079  0.0166*  0.0134*  -0.0045  0.0181~  0.0410* 
  (0.0066)  (0.0075)  (0.0068)  (0.0077)  (0.0105)  (0.0171) 
total adms  -2.79e-07  -7.34e-07**  -3.42e-07  -3.62e-07  -2.77e-07  -2.85e-07 
  (2.44e-07)  (2.32e-07)  (2.41e-07)  (2.42e-07)  (2.42e-07)  (2.40e-07) 
Constant  0.4600**  0.3032**  0.4555**  1.0231**  0.4584**  0.4571** 
  (0.0266)  (0.0124)  (0.0277)  (0.0057)  (0.0273)  (0.0278) 
Observations  1847  1710  1847  1847  1847  1847 
No. of hosps  226  210  226  226  226  226 
R-squared  0.75  0.70  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
Robust standard errors in parentheses             
~ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%               42 
Table 4: Panel estimates of AMI death rates: robustness checks for case-mix 
  AMI death rate 
males 50-69 
AMI death rate 
females 50-69 
time  -0.0058**  -0.0068** 
  (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
comp*92  -0.0018  0.0070** 
  (0.0016)  (0.0017) 
comp*93  0.0008  -0.0015 
  (0.0017)  (0.0017) 
comp*94  0.0058**  -0.0025 
  (0.0017)  (0.0018) 
comp*95  0.0023  0.0049** 
  (0.0019)  (0.0018) 
comp*96  0.0052**  0.0018 
  (0.0019)  (0.0020) 
comp*97  0.0030  -0.0011 
  (0.0020)  (0.0021) 
comp*98  0.0040~  0.0015 
  (0.0021)  (0.0022) 
comp*99  0.0010  -0.0018 
  (0.0023)  (0.0024) 
total admissions  5.50e-08  0.0000 
  (6.43e-08)  (0.0000) 
Constant  0.1168**  0.1652** 
  (0.0047)  (0.0074) 
Observations  1611  1591 
No. of hospitals  193  193 
R-squared  0.68  0.74 
Robust standard errors in parentheses       
~ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         43 
Table 5: Panel estimates of death rates: examination of the impact of size. 





























Above  median 
(total adms/no. 
doctors) 
Time  -0.0056**  -0.0093**  -0.0071**  -0.0083**  -0.0072**  -0.0084**  -0.0073**  -0.0083** 
  (0.0012)  (0.0009)  (0.0012)  (0.0008)  (0.0011)  (0.0009)  (0.0010)  (0.0009) 
Comp*92  0.0109  -0.0048  0.0055  0.0025  0.0092  -0.0013  0.0093  -0.0024 
  (0.0087)  (0.0060)  (0.0087)  (0.0066)  (0.0085)  (0.0066)  (0.0077)  (0.0071) 
Comp*93  0.0105  0.0045  0.0098  0.0076  0.0118  0.0054  0.0128~  0.0040 
  (0.0083)  (0.0057)  (0.0080)  (0.0066)  (0.0077)  (0.0067)  (0.0072)  (0.0068) 
Comp*94  0.0165~  0.0006  0.0103  0.0110~  0.0128  0.0086  0.0168*  0.0036 
  (0.0088)  (0.0057)  (0.0089)  (0.0062)  (0.0084)  (0.0064)  (0.0073)  (0.0075) 
Comp*95  0.0182*  0.0096  0.0166~  0.0163*  0.0175*  0.0145*  0.0245**  0.0065 
  (0.0090)  (0.0061)  (0.0090)  (0.0065)  (0.0085)  (0.0067)  (0.0078)  (0.0069) 
Comp*96  0.0172~  0.0068  0.0187~  0.0118~  0.0153~  0.0133~  0.0255**  0.0020 
  (0.0098)  (0.0064)  (0.0096)  (0.0071)  (0.0091)  (0.0071)  (0.0083)  (0.0075) 
Comp*97  0.0118  0.0014  0.0156  0.0056  0.0154  0.0043  0.0154~  0.0037 
  (0.0105)  (0.0071)  (0.0103)  (0.0076)  (0.0098)  (0.0076)  (0.0091)  (0.0081) 
Comp*98  0.0127  0.0073  0.0215~  0.0092  0.0208*  0.0072  0.0213*  0.0047 
  (0.0111)  (0.0076)  (0.0112)  (0.0078)  (0.0105)  (0.0080)  (0.0094)  (0.0089) 
Comp*99  0.0073  0.0011  0.0176  0.0045  0.0111  0.0056  0.0156  -0.0003 
  (0.0123)  (0.0086)  (0.0124)  (0.0086)  (0.0117)  (0.0089)  (0.0106)  (0.0093) 
Total 
admissions 
-3.12e-07  2.01e-08  -5.55e-07  -1.35e-07  -3.74e-08  -2.16e-07  -1.46e-07  -2.89e-07 
  (4.10e-07)  (3.40e-07)  (4.76e-07)  (3.01e-07)  (4.39e-07)  (3.14e-07)  (3.76e-07)  (3.38e-07) 
Constant  0.2231**  0.2855**  0.3220**  0.2381**  0.4558**  0.3408**  0.4570**  0.2721** 
  (0.0362)  (0.0146)  (0.0223)  (0.0235)  (0.0285)  (0.0238)  (0.0281)  (0.0243) 
Observations  720  990  657  1053  720  982  818  892 
No. of hospitals  95  115  89  121  94  115  103  107 
R-squared  0.80  0.65  0.82  0.60  0.81  0.62  0.77  0.75 
  Robust standard errors in parentheses                 
~ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
   44 
Table 6: Panel estimates of death rates: examination of the impact of hospital resources 
  With income per 
FCE 






With male and 
female SMR  
Without male and 
female SMR  
Time  -0.0086**  -0.0087**  -0.0077**  -0.0078**  -0.0063**  -0.0078** 
  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0009)  (0.0007)  (0.0010)  (0.0007) 
Comp*92  0.0050  0.0051  0.0039  0.0041  0.0046  0.0041 
  (0.0054)  (0.0054)  (0.0054)  (0.0053  (0.0053)  (0.0053) 
Comp*93  0.0102*  0.0104*  0.0087~  0.0090~  0.0074  0.0090~ 
  (0.0050)  (0.0051)  (0.0053)  (0.0051  (0.0050)  (0.0051) 
Comp*94  0.0127*  0.0128*  0.0107~  0.0111*  0.0117*  0.0111* 
  (0.0052)  (0.0052)  (0.0055)  (0.0052)  (0.0053)  (0.0052) 
Comp*95  0.0188**  0.0190**  0.0169**  0.0167**  0.0156**  0.0167** 
  (0.0053)  (0.0052)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0053)  (0.0053) 
Comp*96  0.0179**  0.0180**  0.0147*  0.0151**  0.0140*  0.0151** 
  (0.0055)  (0.0055)  (0.0060)  (0.0056)  (0.0056)  (0.0056) 
Comp*97  0.0135*  0.0136*  0.0102  0.0106~  0.0100~  0.0106~ 
  (0.0059)  (0.0059)  (0.0065)  (0.0061)  (0.0060)  (0.0061) 
Comp*98  0.0172**  0.0173**  0.0140*  0.0145*  0.0140*  0.0145* 
  (0.0062)  (0.0062)  (0.0069)  (0.0064)  (0.0064)  (0.0064) 
Comp*99  0.0132~  0.0132~  0.0096  0.0092  0.0086  0.0092 
  (0.0069)  (0.0069)  (0.0072)  (0.0070)  (0.0070)  (0.0070) 
Total admissions  1.05e-07  1.21e-07  -2.73e-07  -7.34e-07  -0.2.81e-07  -2.72e-07 
  (1.72e-07)  (1.65e-07)  (0.0000)  (2.32e-07)  (2.48e-07)  (2.54e-07) 
Income per head  -0.0005  -  -  -  -  - 
  (0.0018)  -  -  -  -  - 
Detrended regional allocation   -  -  -0.0100  -  -  - 
  -  -  (0.0434)  -  -  - 
Male SMR < 75  -  -  -  -  0.0002  - 
  -  -  -  -  (0.0003)  - 
Female SMR < 75  -  -  -  -  0.0007**  - 
  -  -  -  -  (0.0003)  - 
Constant  0.4670**  0.4617**  0.4628**  0.4601**  0.1551**  0.4601** 
  (0.0323)  (0.0254)  (0.0291)  (0.0266)  (0.0489)  (0.0266) 
Observations  1683  1683  1710  1710  1710  1710 
No. of hospitals  210  210  210  210  210  210 
R-squared  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Competition defined as measure 1, excluding monopolies categorise as high competition. 
~ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; **significant at 1%.         